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The organization of dock labor and, more in particular, the use of dock labor 
schemes has been under EU scrutiny for a long while. The EU however has not come with 
clear-cut answers so far. The diversity of dock labor schemes existing in Europe is an 
important factor in assessing their compatibility with EU law. The compliance of dock labor 
schemes with internal market principles such as the freedom to provide services and the 
freedom of establishment has not been put to the direct test of European jurisprudence yet. It 
was the European Commission’s Directive proposal on port services that put the principle of 
freedom to provide services centre-stage. This paper sets out the EU legal and policy 
framework that applies to dock labor schemes. It also gives an extensive analysis of how 
dock labor interests contributed to the failure of the port services’ Directive. It further 
describes the process that emerged after the downfall of the Directive, including the 
proposal to set up a European social dialogue on port labor. Finally, it gives insight in ways 
in which European policy-makers may address the issue in the future. 
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1. Introduction: A Brief History of European Ports Policy 
 
The debate on a common policy framework for European ports is almost as 
old as the European integration process itself. Especially the European Parliament 
was an early advocate of a common ports policy and published from 1961 until 1993 
a series of reports and resolutions calling for an ambitious agenda covering port 
organisation, financing, labour etc. Parliament however did in those days not have 
the same political influence it has today and its calls for a common ports policy were 
initially not actively taken up by the European Commission.  
In a non-published note from 1970, the Commission did identify the two 
main objectives that would characterise all of its future attempts to devise a common 
ports policy: to ensure, on the one hand, the consistent application of general Treaty 
rules, notably with regard to competition and the basic internal market freedoms, 
and, on the other hand, to achieve a balanced development of European ports 
(Commission of the European Communities 1970).  In 1974, the Commission set up 
a Port Working Group of port authority representatives from Europe’s major ports 
which produced a so-called ‘Fact-Finding Report’ which showed considerable 
diversity in the organisation, management, operations, finance and legal obligations 
of the ports that were surveyed in the then 8 Member States of the European Union.2 
The majority of the experts came to the conclusion that these differences however 
did not seem to be capable of provoking serious distortions to competition which 
would require solutions at Community level. The Commission initially followed this 
‘non-interventionist’ approach advocated by the sector.  
Things changed in the early 1990s however when the Commission devised a 
common transport policy which aimed to develop a coherent European infrastructure 
network through the concept of the Trans-European Transport Networks (TEN-T) 
and the objective of achieving ‘sustainable mobility’. The latter gave a prominent 
place to intra-European maritime transport as an environmental-friendly alternative 
to congested road transport. A specific communication on ‘short sea shipping’ 
followed in 1995 which contained a section on ports policy. This was followed by a 
‘Green Paper on Sea Ports and Maritime Infrastructure’ produced in 1997. This 
discussion paper can be seen as the Commission’s first genuine attempt to move 
towards a coherent policy on ports and maritime infrastructure. The Commission 
then published in 2001 a communication on the improvement of quality services in 
ports. The operational part of this communication was a Directive proposal on 
market access to port services.  
In what can best be described as a very unusual political process, the 
Commission’s proposal failed twice to gain political majority in the European 
                                               
2 An updated version of the Fact Finding Report followed in 1986. In 1993, the European Sea Ports 
Organisation (ESPO) was born out of the Port Working Group as an independent lobby for European 
port authorities. ESPO produced further updates of the report in 1996 and 2005 and a conceptually 
revised edition was published in May 2011. 
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Parliament. After the second rejection, in January 2006, the Commission withdrew 
the proposal and initiated a major consultation round of stakeholders which resulted 
in an all-embracing ‘Ports Policy Communication’, which mainly relied on ‘soft 
law’ in the form of guidance and recommendations. The action plan contained in the 
communication is currently being implemented, with some actions progressing 
faster than others. Table 1 summarises the main steps involved up to the present 
date. 
Table 1. Main steps in the making of a common European ports policy 
1961 First European Parliament report to call for a common ports policy 
1974 Foundation of the Community Port Working Group 
1991 Commission White Paper on Transport Policy 
1993 Foundation of the European Sea Ports Organisation 
1995 Commission Communication on Short Sea Shipping 
1997 Commission Green Paper on Sea Ports and Maritime Infrastructure 
2001 First Directive Proposal on Market Access to Port Services 
2004 Second Directive Proposal on Market Access to Port Services 
2007 Commission Communication on European Ports Policy 
The following sections will analyse more in detail to what extent European 
law and policy regarding ports impacts on port labour arrangements and, more 
specifically, dock labour schemes. A first section will address the application of the 
basic principles of the EU Treaty. This is then followed by descriptions of the 
genesis of the Commission’s port services’ Directive proposal and its main 
provisions on port labour. Next comes a brief analysis of the process that led to the 
downfall of the proposal and a section which looks at what the Commission’s 2007 
Ports Policy Communication, which was issued after the downfall of the port 
services’ Directive, has to say about port labour. A final section sheds light on some 
recent developments. 
 
2.  Dock Labour Schemes and the Principles of the EU Treaty 
 
The organisation of dock labour varies considerably throughout Europe. In 
many Member States the system is rather opaque and, to the present day, no 
comprehensive European overview exists.  The variety starts with the interpretation 
of what ‘dock labour’ actually means. This can be defined very narrowly (loading 
and unloading of ships) or very broadly (all forms of cargo handling in a port, 
including warehousing, stuffing and stripping, loading and unloading from inland 
waterway vessels, trucks, railway wagons etc.). Also ‘dock workers’ come in many 
shapes and forms, ranging from civil servants in state-owned service ports, workers 
directly employed by private terminal operating companies or workers employed 
through dock labour schemes. 
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In the context of this analysis, the focus is on the latter, i.e. systems whereby 
ports have centrally managed pools of registered dock workers. Such schemes were 
historically introduced to protect dockers from suffering abuse of their rights as a 
result of the inherent fluctuations in dock labour, a phenomenon which was more 
outspoken in the pre-container era. 
Dock labour schemes themselves show a great variety. The use of registered 
dockers through a pool can be mandatory or not. This obligation can be de facto or 
imposed by law. The scheme can cover all work or only temporary work during 
peak periods. The scheme can be financed by all operating companies in a port or it 
can be (co-) financed by the port authority, subsidised by government etc. Finally, a 
labour pool can be organised in the form of an undertaking that provides labour 
services to port operators or workers in a pool can be hired by these operators. 
The latter distinction is particularly important with regard to the application 
of the basic rules of the EU Treaty3 as shall be discussed below. The organisation of 
dock labour schemes is notably subject to Treaty rules on competition and the so-
called four basic freedoms, i.e. freedom of establishment, free movement of 
workers, goods and services. 
Although jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) with regard 
to the application of these principles to dock labour schemes is relatively scarce, 
there are a number of important cases which have given guidance on the 
compatibility of dock labour schemes with EU law. Three cases from the 1990s 
stand out in particular. These relate to the organisation of dock labour in the port of 
Genoa (Merci case, C-179/90), the port of La Spezia (Raso case, C-163/96) and the 
port of Ghent (Becu case, C-22/98). 
The Merci case concerned the application of EU competition rules (Art. 101 
of the EU Treaty and further) on centuries-old dockers corporations that had the 
exclusive right to provide dock labour in Italian ports. The Court ruled that the mere 
fact of creating a dominant position by granting exclusive rights was in itself not 
incompatible with the Treaty. It would therefore be possible for Member States to 
grant exclusive rights to a corporation whereby port users have to take recourse to 
registered dockers supplied through this corporation. There are however limits to the 
use of such exclusive rights. In the case of Genoa, the Court found that the 
corporation which had the monopoly to perform dock work demanded payment for 
services which had not been requested, charged disproportionate prices and refused 
to have recourse to modern technology, all of which involved an increase in the cost 
of the operations and a prolongation of the time required for their performance. The 
Court also found that dock work is not, in principle, a service of general economic 
interest.  
                                               
3 References to the ‘Treaty’ are based on the consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU) also known as the ‘Lisbon Treaty’. 
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Following the Merci case ruling, Italy reformed its port legislation in 1994 
but maintained measures in favour of the old corporations. These were transformed 
in port companies that provided port services in competition with independent 
operators, but they maintained a monopoly for the provision of temporary labour to 
deal with peak periods. The Court ruled in the Raso case (Port of La Spezia) that the 
former dockers corporation was thus put in a conflict of interest situation which led 
it to abuse its dominant position. 
What made the Genoa and La Spezia cases different from many other labour 
schemes is that the provision of dock work was organised through a form of 
undertaking. In many ports this is not the case and this therefore makes the 
application of EU competition rules not possible. This was made clear through the 
Becu case where, referring to the legally protected dock labour monopoly existing in 
Belgian ports, the Court was asked whether individuals can oppose, on grounds of 
competition law, legislation of a Member State which requires them to have 
exclusive recourse, for the performance of dock work, to recognised dockers and 
have to pay these dockers remuneration far in excess of the wages of their own 
employees or the wages they pay to other workers.  The Court confirmed that there 
was a question of granting exclusive rights involved in the port of Ghent, but since 
these were not confirmed to undertakings, but to recognised dockers that had an 
employment relationship with the undertakings for which they perform dock work, 
Community competition law was not applicable. The Court added that, even taken 
collectively, the recognised dockers in a port area could not be regarded as 
constituting an undertaking. It would be different if recognised dockers would be 
linked by a relationship of association or by any other form of organisation which 
would support the inference that they operate on the market in dock work as an 
entity or as workers of such an entity. 
It is remarkable that the Court seemed to have regretted that the question 
referred to it did not ask whether the obligation to have recourse, for dock work, to 
the services of recognised workers, is capable of constituting, for other recognised 
dockers and/or workers satisfying the conditions for recognition, a barrier for the 
purposes of article 45 (free movement of workers) and/or article 56 (freedom to 
provide services)4. 
It was precisely the principle of freedom to provide services that formed the 
basis of the port services’ Directive. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
4 The Brussels labour court ruled on 11 January 2002 in a similar case concerning dock labour in the 
port of Brussels that the Belgian legislation governing the dock labour scheme (the Major Law) was 
contrary to the freedom to provide services. The Belgian State appealed against this ruling, but the 
appeal case was never actually started. 
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3.  The Ports’ Green Paper and the Genesis of the Port Services’ Directive 
 
As explained earlier, the Green Paper on Sea Ports and Maritime 
Infrastructure was the European Commission’s first genuine initiative to come to a 
common policy framework for ports. The Green Paper was initiated by Transport 
Commissioner Neil Kinnock. 
As regards port services, the Green Paper indicated that, complementary to 
the case-by-case approach followed until then, Community action could be 
envisaged in the form of developing a regulatory framework aiming at a more 
systematic liberalisation of the port services market in the main ports with 
international traffic. The Commission indicated that such a framework would be 
especially relevant for technical-nautical services (i.e. pilotage, towage and 
mooring), but did not exclude its application to cargo handling. The Commission 
recognised that restrictions had been gradually removed from the market of cargo-
handling services, but pointed at the same time at port labour rigidities which 
remained characteristic of the sector, mainly where it concerned the registration of 
port workers and the existence of port labour pools in a number of EU ports. The 
Commission also said that, generally, restrictions or conditions for registration do 
not pose problems as long as these are non-discriminatory, necessary and 
proportional. An obligation for port operators to participate in the pools and/or use 
exclusively workers who are members of the pool for their port operations may, 
however, under certain circumstances constitute a de-facto restriction to market 
access. The Commission also referred explicitly to the possibility of ‘self-supply’, 
which would later become better known as ‘self-handling’, i.e. the right for port 
users to perform certain services themselves. According to the Green Paper this right 
could only be restricted if it would be detrimental to safety standards or the 
functioning of public service restrictions. 
Not surprisingly, the Green Paper provoked substantial debate. Whereas 
trade unions were downright negative about the proposed liberalisation of port 
services, representative organisations of ship-owners and shippers were very much 
welcoming EU intervention in this field, hoping this would also imply the 
‘adjustment of outmoded labour prescriptions’ (Commission of the European 
Communities 1998). Port authorities and terminal operators were rather lukewarm 
on the issue, attaching greater value to the question of State aid in ports and the 
Commission’s proposed intervention on port charging. Terminal operators lobbied 
through their trade organisation FEPORT (Federation of European Private Port 
Operators) for a differentiated approach on port services, whereby cargo handling 
would remain largely untouched. This approach found support in the European 
Parliament. 
The Commission would however pursue in the end with a legislative 
proposal that would cover cargo handling services, including both the use of dock 
155 
Dock Labor Schemes in the Context 
of EU Law and Policy 
 
labour and self-handling5. This was not so obviously clear however in the period 
immediately following the Green Paper. Contradictory signals were given, for 
instance by Commissioner Kinnock who in 1998 urged Member States to ratify ILO 
Conventions 137 and 152 on dock labour6. At the very same time, his services were 
compiling, with the assistance of FEPORT, a comparative report on dock labour 
arrangements and self-handling in European ports, a report which was never 
published. 
A clearer course was taken after a new Commission took office in 1999. 
Neil Kinnock remained member of the new team, but passed the transport portfolio 
on to the late Loyola de Palacio; She was not only determined to make EU short sea 
shipping policy a success, but she also wanted to restore the perceived north-south 
imbalance in Europe, by making ports in the Mediterranean more competitive. A 
legislative instrument on port services, including dock labour, would help getting 
reforms through, not in the least in her own country, Spain, where the government 
was in the process of preparing new national legislation on port services that would 
pave the way to a full landlord model and reduce restrictive dock labour practices. 
She initiated the concrete follow-up to the Green Paper and, after a brief 
consultation round of stakeholders, the Commission published on 13 February 2001 
its Communication ‘Reinforcing Quality Services in Sea Ports: A Key for European 
Transport’ of which the operational part was a Directive Proposal on Market Access 
to Port Services. The Communication acknowledged, as did the Green Paper, that 
liberalisation of cargo handling services had advanced significantly, certainly 
compared to technical-nautical services such as pilotage, but noted that this was still 
far from uniform in all Community ports. In addition, the Commission recognised 
the need to have clear and reliable procedures setting out the rights and obligations 
of potential service providers, as well as those of the competent national authorities 
involved in overseeing the ports and/or the selection of service providers. 
 
4. The Right to Employ Personnel of own Choice and “Self-Handling” 
 
The Directive proposal established the basic rule that Member States may 
require an authorisation for the providers of port services. In case the number of 
providers of port services would be limited, then these would have to be selected 
through a transparent and objective selection procedure and would thus 
automatically be granted an authorisation.  The essence of the proposal was thus 
                                               
5 The latter had already been established in 1996 as a principle for airports through Directive 96/67/EC 
on access to the ground-handling market at Community airports. An often-heard criticism on the 
original port services’ proposal was that it was a mere copy of the airports Directive. 
6 ILO Convention 137 of 1973 stipulates that registered dock workers have priority of engagement for 
dock work. It is currently ratified by 24 countries, of which 8 are Member States of the European 
Union. The Dutch government originally ratified the Convention as well, but denounced it in 2006. 
ILO Convention 152 of 1979 deals with occupational safety and health in dock work. It is currently 
ratified by 26 countries, of which 9 are Member States of the European Union. 
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about the way in which port authorities use concessions, lease agreements or other 
types of ‘authorisations’ to regulate market access for potential service providers, 
thus ensuring market contestability and intra-port competition. 
The Directive stipulated that the (selected) provider of port services would 
have the right to employ personnel of his own choice to carry out the service 
covered by the authorisation. Although legal opinions about the impact of this clause 
differed, it was meant to counter the mandatory use of dock labour pools. 
The proposal furthermore obliged Member States to take the necessary 
measures to allow the principle of ‘self-handling’, which was defined as ‘a situation 
in which a port user provides for itself one or more categories of port services and 
where normally no contract of any description with a third party is concluded for the 
provision of such services’. The Directive further stipulated that self-handling could 
be subject to an authorisation, but criteria for such an authorisation could however 
not be stricter than those applying to providers of the same or a comparable service. 
 
5. The Political Process Leading to the Downfall of the Port Services’ 
Directive 
 
The full analysis of the political and lobbying intrigue that led to the 
downfall of the port services’ Directive would fill an entire book7. This section 
attempts to summarise the main highlights of this remarkable process. Table 2 
provides a chronological overview of the main steps involved. 
Table 2. Political process port services’ Directive 2001-2006 
13 Feb 2001 Commission publishes first Directive proposal – COM(2001)35 
14 Nov 2001 Parliament adopts opinion in first reading 
19 Feb 2002 Commission issues modified proposal based on Parliament’s opinion 
17 Jun 2002 Council reaches political agreement in first reading 
5 Nov 2002 Council adopts formal common position in first reading 
11 Mar 2003 Parliament adopts opinion in second reading 
22 Jul 2003 Council adopts common position in second reading 
9 Sep 2003 Conciliation meetings start 
29 Sep 2003 Conciliation delegations of Parliament and Council reach compromise 
20 Nov 2003 Parliament rejects conciliation compromise, the proposal falls 
13 Oct 2004 Commission publishes new Directive proposal – COM(2004)654 
18 Jan 2006 Parliament rejects second Directive proposal in first reading 
8 Mar 2006 Commission officially withdraws the second proposal 
The Directive proposal was subject to the co-decision procedure, a process 
whereby the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers go through one or 
                                               
7 Such a book is currently being prepared by T. Pallis and the author. It is meant to be a follow up to 
Chlomoudis and Pallis’ standard work on European Union Port Policy (2002) and it is expected to be 
published in 2013 by Edward Elgar. 
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two ‘readings’ of the Commission’s proposal and decide on amendments. If after 
two readings Council and Parliament cannot come to an agreement, a third and more 
restricted ‘conciliation’ reading is held. This is usually the case for more 
controversial proposals as the port services’ Directive certainly was. In this 
particular case the conciliation phase was unsuccessful, something which does not 
occur often. What is even more exceptional – if not unique – is that a revised 
Directive proposal, that the Commission issued a year after the rejection of the 
initial proposal, was turned down as well. 
The political and lobbying process on the Directive was a ‘hands-on’ 
learning experience for many stakeholder organisations that were for the first time 
confronted with a European legislative proposal that had such a potentially large 
impact on their members. This was certainly the case for the European Sea Ports 
Organisation (ESPO). ESPO initially struggled mainly with the diverse governance 
systems in European ports, for which the Directive would either have meant a 
welcome instrument to push national or local reforms through or an unwelcome 
bureaucratic intrusion in an already liberalised system. Forced by the awareness that 
only a common position would be able to influence the political process, a 
compromise position was eventually found which confirmed that a European legal 
framework on market access to port services could have added value, provided that a 
series of substantial amendments would be introduced which reinforced the strategic 
function of the port authority (Verhoeven 2006; 2009; 2010). 
 Also trade unions were confronted with internal disputes. These were partly 
related to different interpretations about the content (not all unions felt equally 
concerned), differences about the strategy to follow and dispersed representation at 
EU level. The main representative organisation was and still is the European 
Transport Workers’ Federation (ETF), which originated as an independent European 
organisation, but which became in 1999 a regional division of the long-established 
International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF). Tensions about jurisdiction and 
strategic approaches remained nevertheless rife. Whereas ETF was in favour of a 
more ‘conventional’ lobbying approach, ITF advocated ‘militant’ strategy through 
rank-and-file mobilisation and collective industrial action. Complicating the process 
was the rivalry with the International Dockers Council (IDC), a more militant 
‘grass-roots’ federation of dockers born out of the labour dispute in Liverpool at the 
end of the 1990s and with a stronghold in Mediterranean ports (Turnbull 2006). 
As a result of these internal differences, unions did not manage to get 
fundamental amendments through when the Directive was discussed in first reading 
in Parliament. Parliament therefore kept cargo handling within the scope of the 
Directive and maintained both the right to employ personnel of own choice and the 
right to self-handling in its first reading opinion on the proposal. The lobbying of 
pilots had been more effective as Parliament proposed to exclude pilotage from the 
scope of the Directive. 
Militant trade union action became only visible during the debate in Council 
which was held under the Spanish Presidency in the first half of 2002. Unions linked 
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the debate on the Directive to the debate on the Lisbon Strategy and made it symbol 
of the un-social character of the European Union. In this way the original set up of 
the Directive, i.e. to apply the principle of freedom to provide services to the port 
sector, became completely buried by, often exaggerated, arguments about 
uncontrolled competition, social dumping and unsafe ports. The portrayal of ruthless 
shipowners bringing shiploads of Filipino workers to European ports to take over 
jobs of registered dock workers is but one example of the wild stories that were told 
to persuade public opinion that the Directive was an outrageous assault on dockers’ 
rights. 
Since the Spanish Presidency wanted to have the Directive in place to 
support its national port reform plan it was ready to accept many amendments, but 
not to the extent that the Directive would become an empty shell, as trade unions 
were now demanding. The right to employ personnel of own choice and the right to 
self-handling were made conditional to elements of safety, environment, public 
service and social protection, but remained firmly in the Directive. 
Trade unions had meanwhile opted for a dual strategy, using militant actions 
such as walk-outs and mass manifestations, which were held both in Brussels and 
Strasbourg, but also conventional lobbying techniques. It is remarkable how in some 
countries, like Belgium and the UK, unions managed to form ‘unholy alliances’ with 
port authorities and port employer organisations that would normally take a pro-
liberalisation stance. Union pressure persuaded especially socialist and other left-
wing Members of Parliament to table more radical amendments for second reading. 
Much to their surprise, these amendment proposals were procedurally not accepted 
as they were contrary to Parliament’s opinion in first reading. 
This further radicalised union positions and mobilised the militant 
component of their strategy, which now essentially went for the complete rejection 
of the Directive, the fall-back position being an ‘empty’ Directive as far as dock 
labour was concerned. The general perception is therefore that it was union pressure 
that single-handedly led Parliament on 20 November 2003 to reject the conciliation 
compromise with a narrow majority of 229 votes against 209 and 16 abstentions. 
Unions certainly claimed it as a massive victory. The principal reasons for 
Parliament’s rejection were however more subtle. First there was the fact that 
Parliament’s Rapporteur Georg Jarzembowski was eager to come to a quick deal 
with Council and had not used the full time available to negotiate a conciliation 
compromise with Council’s delegation8, something which mainly the socialist group 
resented9. Several sources within the party confirmed afterwards that they would 
                                               
8 A deal was already reached at the first meeting of the Conciliation Committee. 
9 The socialist group thus became determined to vote against the compromise. However, on the day 
that the vote in Parliament was scheduled, the German delegation in the group was holding a party 
congress outside Strasbourg. This led the group to move the voting day to Thursday which is 
traditionally the day with the highest absenteeism during Parliament’s Strasbourg week. On the day of 
the vote only 454 out of 626 MEPs were present, the day before 530 still took part in the voting 
session. 
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have accepted the compromise should the full possibilities of negotiation have been 
used. Another factor was no doubt the eagerness of some MEPs to demonstrate the 
power of Parliament versus the Commission and the Council. Probably the most 
important overall factor was the effect of the upcoming European elections in June 
2004. It is clear that if the vote would have taken place further away from an 
election period more MEPs would have resisted local pressures. Whilst pressure of 
trade unions has no doubt contributed significantly to the downfall of the Directive, 
it would be exaggerated to write the result fully on their account. 
Late spring 2004, it became clear that the Commission was devising a new 
proposal. At the ESPO Annual Conference, held in Rotterdam on 17-18 June that 
year, Commissioner De Palacio confirmed this. The revised proposal saw the light 
of day on 13 October, a few weeks before the Prodi-Commission ended its mandate. 
This was in itself a rather unusual move for a resigning college. The revised 
proposal did try to meet a number of trade union concerns and proposed that: 
 
- authorisations were mandatory; 
- the provider of port services carrying out the service covered by the 
authorisation has the right to employ personnel of his own choice provided 
that he fulfils a number of criteria such as compliance with employment and 
social rules, including those laid down in collective agreements, provided 
that they are compatible with Community law; 
- as a rule, self-handling for cargo and passenger operations may be 
provided using the land-based personnel of the self-handler, but is subject to 
an authorisation, it may also be done with sea-faring personnel for an 
authorised regular shipping service carried out in the context of short sea 
shipping and Motorways of the Sea, again in compliance with national rules, 
provided these are compatible with Community law. 
 
As a token of goodwill to the unions, the Commission added in its 
explanatory memorandum a recommendation that Member States should ratify the 
ILO Conventions on dock labour. 
Unions were not to be convinced however. Already at the ESPO conference 
in June, the ETF representative present had declared that issuing a similar proposal 
would be ‘an unacceptable provocation’ (ESPO 2004a) which they could not explain 
to their members.  Whereas some ETF leaders would have been ready to negotiate, 
rank-and-file dockers could not be stopped and, as soon as the new proposal came 
forward, aggressive labour opposition started. The difference with the first proposal 
was that those stakeholders that had defended the Directive were now a lot less 
enthusiast in their support. Shipowner interests found the proposal too protectionist 
whereas port authorities were disappointed that a number of good compromises 
reached on the first proposal were no longer retained in the new one. Even if 
Parliament’s Rapporteur was ready to make further concessions to unions, by 
proposing to fully exclude self-handling, all attempts to salvage the second proposal 
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proved to be in vain. Parliament rejected the proposal on 18 January 2006 with 532 
votes against 120 and 25 abstentions. During the voting week unions staged in 
Strasbourg the most violent demonstration against the Directive ever, which was 
however completely unnecessary, given that it was clear enough that Parliament 
would not back the proposal. 
 
6. The 2007 Ports Policy Communication and its “Soft Law” Approach 
 
Following the final downfall of the Directive proposal on market access to 
port services, it looked for a while as if the prospect of a European ports policy was 
definitely off the table. This would have left ports governed by the basic principles 
of the Treaty and secondary legislation not specifically designed for ports. The 
essential question was whether it would be in the interest of ports to be subject to an 
incoherent patchwork of jurisprudence and legislation which often demonstrated 
contradictions. Already in 2004, ESPO had made a plea for a thorough reflection on 
the priorities of a European seaport policy, expressing the need for a coherent 
framework with a broad perspective focusing on the main challenges of the port 
sector (ESPO 2004b). The time for such a profound discussion only became ripe 
after the failure of the second Directive proposal. Several factors helped to bring the 
debate back on its feet. There was first of all the determination of the new Transport 
Commissioner, Jacques Barrot, to restore a climate of confidence after the traumatic 
experience of the Directive. In addition, the Commission had launched a process to 
develop a comprehensive and integrated maritime policy, which covered ports. 
Finally, there was the proposal of ESPO to organise a wide-ranging stakeholder 
consultation on the principal themes and challenges of a European ports policy. The 
latter two initiatives broadened the scope of the debate beyond the traditional 
transport policy context.   
Between June 2006 and June 2007, the Commission held an extensive and 
unprecedented stakeholder consultation process which consisted of two conferences 
and six thematic workshops covering a broad spectrum of issues, including port 
authorities and port services, port financing, sustainable development of port 
capacity and environmental issues, labour issues and technical-nautical services, 
hinterland connections, competition and cooperation with neighbouring non-EU 
ports and the image of ports.  
Participation to the consultation process was high and very active. One of 
the workshops dealt specifically with labour-related questions and was held in 
Valencia on 8-9 March 2007. The workshop focused among other things on the 
organisation of labour pools. Some stakeholders questioned these arrangements and 
declared them incompatible with the Treaty principle of freedom to provide services, 
whereas others put up a staunch defence for reasons of social protection and safety. 
The conclusions of the workshop highlighted the need to move from pooling 
systems towards a permanent, trained workforce. It was added that this should be 
done smoothly, by means of social dialogue between employers and unions 
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(Commission of the European Communities 2007a). The conclusions also said that 
casualisation of port work was to be avoided, particularly when competition between 
ports would result in reduction of wages. The workshop further came out with a plea 
for a social dialogue at European level, although considerable discussion existed 
about what this dialogue should focus on and which parties should be involved. 
The consultation resulted in a Commission communication on European 
ports policy which was published 18 October 2007 (Commission of the European 
Communities 2007b). The communication resorted under the Commission’s 
integrated maritime policy and formed part of its freight transport agenda, which 
were both adopted around the same time. The communication’s actual policy 
proposals were spread over six areas as summarised in table 3. 
The measures proposed in the communication largely rely on ‘soft law’, i.e. 
non-binding guidance or interpretation, rather than actual legislation. Two of the 
themes laid out in the communication concern port labour. First is the ‘level playing 
field’ theme which recognises, as the Green Paper already did in 1997, the evolution 
of cargo handling, both in technological terms and in the context of ports 
transforming into gateways to logistics chains. The communication also recognises 
the diversity of port labour arrangements, whereby port workers are often directly 
employed by terminal operators, while in some ports they are contracted via pools, 
which are defined as ‘entities in charge of recruiting and training port workers’. The 
above described diversity of pooling arrangements is also mentioned. 
Table 3. Main themes 2007 ports policy communication 
Theme Most important measures 
proposed 
Planned 
timing 
Current status 
Port performance and 
hinterland connections 
Evaluation ports hinterland 
connections status in context 
mid-term review TEN-T 
2009-2010 TEN-T proposals 
published October 
2011 
Expanding capacity while 
respecting the environment 
Guidelines on application Natura 
2000 legislation 
2008 Published March 
2011 
Modernisation Common Maritime Space 
without Barriers 
2009-2010 Pilot project 
ongoing 
A level playing field – clarity 
for investors, operators and 
users 
State aid guidelines 2008 Uncertain if they 
will be issued  
Establishing a structured 
dialogue between ports and 
cities 
European ‘Open Ports’ Day in 
context European Maritime Day 
(EMD) 
2008 EMD organised 
annually 
Work in ports Sectoral social dialogue on ports 
Proposal on mutual recognition 
of training 
Not 
indicated 
 
Not 
indicated 
Possibly start in 
2012 
Uncertain if it will 
be issued 
The Commission confirms that Treaty rules on freedom of establishment 
and freedom to provide services can fully apply to the activities carried out by the 
pools. Whilst recognising that these pools often provide sound training to workers 
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and are an efficient tool for employers (e.g. to cover peak periods), the Commission 
stipulates that such arrangements should not be used to prevent suitably qualified 
individuals or undertakings from providing cargo-handling services, or to impose, 
on employers, workforce that they do not need. This could under certain 
circumstances fall foul of the Treaty rules on the internal market, in particular of 
Article 49 on freedom of establishment and Article 56 on freedom to provide 
services. This wording is almost identical to that of the 1997 ports’ Green Paper. 
The communication also contains a theme dedicated to ‘work in ports’, but 
this looks less at compatibility of dock labour with legal provisions. It rather 
advocates the establishment of dialogue between stakeholders as a means to 
contribute significantly to a better understanding between parties concerned and a 
successful management of change. The Commission particularly encourages the 
establishment of a European sectoral social dialogue committee as a means to 
contribute to management of change, modernisation and more and better jobs. The 
Commission also announces that it would propose a mutually recognisable 
framework on training of port workers in different fields of port activities and would 
monitor closely the implementation of Community rules on safety and health of 
workers at work and pursue a more systematic collection of accident statistics. 
 
7. Recent Developments 
 
At the time of writing this paper, which is four years after the ports policy 
communication was published, nothing concrete has happened yet with regard to 
dock labour. Bearing in mind the trauma of the port services’ Directive, the 
Commission preferred to wait until social partners came forward with a joint request 
to set up a European sectoral social dialogue before taking any initiatives at all. 
Although trade unions and terminal operators seemed to be eager to get this social 
dialogue started back in 2007, a concrete proposal from the social partners to set up 
the dialogue only came forward in spring 2011. This delay was mainly due to 
internal discussions between trade union organisations (ETF and IDC) and port 
organisations (FEPORT and ESPO) about their representation. Taking into account 
the formalities involved, a social dialogue could now start at the earliest in 2012. It 
can be assumed however that the delicate question of labour pool organisation will 
not be the first item that will be addressed, let alone solved.  
Partly incited by the slow progress on social dialogue, the Commission 
recently started a review of its ‘soft law’ policy for ports. In its new Transport Policy 
White Paper (Commission of the European Communities 2011), the Commission 
announced that it will review restrictions on market access to port services. For dock 
labour, this will be done through a study on ‘port labour, health, safety and 
qualifications’ of which results are expected by spring 2012. The study will build on 
a report that the Institute of Transport and Maritime Management Antwerp 
(ITMMA) produced in 2010 on behalf of ESPO (ITMMA 2010), but it is expected 
to go much more in-depth. The study will have to provide an in-depth overview of 
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labour-related issues of the stevedoring sector in EU ports (labour conditions, labour 
arrangements, training and qualifications, health and safety issues), to identify 
possible shortcomings in these areas and to propose recommendations, including 
action at Commission level 
 
8.  Conclusions 
 
The organisation of dock labour and, more in particular, the use of dock 
labour schemes has been under EU scrutiny for a long while but the EU has not 
come with clear-cut answers so far. 
The diversity of dock labour schemes existing in Europe is an important 
factor in assessing their compatibility with EU law. A principal difference needs to 
be made between schemes whereby dock labour is provided through a form of 
undertaking, in which case both the competition and internal market rules of the 
Treaty apply, and schemes whereby a pool of recognised dockers exists in a port but 
whereby these dockers are employed by local terminal operators. In that case only 
internal market rules can be applied. 
So far, case-law of the European Court of Justice has focused on the first 
type only. From this, it appears to be possible for Member States to grant exclusive 
rights to a corporation whereby port users have to take recourse to registered 
dockers supplied through this corporation. There are however limits to the use of 
such exclusive rights. If a corporation which has the monopoly to perform dock 
work would demand payment for services which have not been requested, charge 
disproportionate prices and refuse to have recourse to modern technology, then there 
would be an abuse of dominant position. From case-law it is also clear that dock 
work is not, in principle, a service of general economic interest.  
The compatibility of dock labour schemes with internal market principles 
such as the freedom to provide services and the freedom of establishment has not 
been put to the direct scrutiny of the European Court of Justice yet. 
It was the European Commission’s Directive proposal on port services that 
put the principle of freedom to provide services centre-stage. This proposal would 
have introduced the right for authorised service providers in ports to employ 
personnel of their own choice as well as the right for port users to provide port 
services with their own personnel (‘self-handling’). In what can best be described as 
a very unusual political process, the proposal however failed twice to find a political 
majority. Although not entirely justified, trade union organisations have claimed the 
downfall of the Directive as their victory. This has greatly reinforced their power, 
both at European and national level, thus rendering vital reform processes in a 
number of Member States more difficult than ever. The failure of the Directive can 
164 
 
European Research Studies,  Volume XIV, Issue (2), 2011 
 
generally be seen as a missed opportunity to create legal certainty about the use of 
dock labour schemes10. 
 Following the downfall of the Directive, the Commission has chosen a non-
confrontational approach based on ‘soft law’. Its opinion on the compatibility of 
dock labour pools has not fundamentally changed compared to the 1997 Green 
Paper, but it  remains very general, i.e. dock labour schemes can be compatible with 
Treaty rules unless these would be used to prevent suitably qualified individuals or 
undertakings from providing cargo-handling services, or to impose, on employers, 
workforce that they do not need or impose similar restrictions. 
In the non-confrontational spirit that emerged after the downfall of the 
Directive, the Commission has for some years not undertaken any further initiatives 
on the issue, neither in the form of a new legislative proposal, nor in the form of 
case-by-case action. It has put responsibility with European social partners, hoping 
that these would address the issue through a sectoral social dialogue. Social partners 
however took considerable time to set up such a dialogue. This is now expected to 
commence in 2012, but it is unlikely that the delicate question of labour pool 
organisation will be the first item that will be addressed, let alone solved. 
The use of dock labour pools under EU law and policy therefore remains 
uncertain. Meanwhile, ports in several Member States continue to struggle with 
restrictions imposed by dock labour schemes that gravely affect their 
competitiveness. 
This explains why the Commission has recently taken the initiative to 
reconsider its ‘soft law’ policy and started reviewing restrictions on market access to 
port services, including those related to dock labour. The Commission’s intention to 
map out a comprehensive overview of dock labour arrangements in European ports 
is probably the most effective way forward. This would then have to go beyond the 
prima facie evidence, but also reveal the actual practices involved. On this basis it 
would be perfectly possible to identify situations which are in breach of EU law. 
The question then remains whether anyone will have the courage to act upon the 
conclusions of such an analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
10 The failure of the Directive was also a missed opportunity for governments and port authorities 
wishing to introduce, complete or refine governance reform or reorganisation programmes. The 
Directive would furthermore have provided port authorities with a set of common principles on the use 
of concession-type instruments which would have strengthened their position in changing market 
surroundings (see Verhoeven 2009 for a fuller analysis). 
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